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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a security infrastructure
for communication between agents adaptable to FIPA security
specifications by employing security patterns and semantic based
policy descriptions. Security patterns are used as a generalized
approach for generating security based services. This paper
analyzes the authentication and semantic based access control
among agents by using the security patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent systems(MAS), which communicate in an open
environment like Internet, face safety and security problems.
Therefore, MAS should have some strategies, policies and
mechanisms for confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-
repudiation [1], [2], [3]. This paper proposes a security in-
frastructure intended for a FIPA compliant multi-agent system
namely SEAGENT [4], and provides a solution by using secu-
rity patterns with semantic web for policy based approaches.
SEAGENT agents demanding for secure access will be utiliz-
ing Agent Authenticator, Agent Certification Authority(ACA)
and Access Controller patterns that have been explained in
Tropos methodology [5].
II. BACKGROUND
SEAGENT is a P2P Java framework for writing Semantic
Web enabled Multi-Agent applications [4]. The main objective
of SEAGENT project is to develop an agent framework for
constructing FIPA-compliant multi-agent platforms that work
on semantic web environment. It’s communication module
supports current web based communication protocols both for
intra-platform and inter-platform communication.
Agent oriented software engineering is one of the most
natural ways of characterizing security issues in information
systems. This approach allows developers first to model the
security requirements in high-level and then incrementally ap-
ply these requirements to security mechanisms as services(or
agents) in the multi-agent systems [6], [7].
This paper uses the approach that has been detailed in [7].
The authors of Tropos merged the advantages of the agent
oriented programming and security patterns paradigms by ap-
plying both of them in the Tropos methodology. Secure Tropos
extends the agent oriented software engineering methodology
by providing a set of security-related concepts and processes
to allow developers to consider security issues throughout the
development stages. By using this methodology, agent oriented
concepts could identify a set of security requirements needed
by the system and these requirements can be transformed to
a design with the use of security patterns.
Since SEAGENT is a FIPA-based multi-agent system, FIPA
specifications have been followed throughout this work. First,
all agents must register to Agent Management System(AMS).
AMS has the responsibility to monitor the lifecycle of agents
and agents must inform AMS about their platform related
actions(register, deregister and so on). Second, software agents
must also register their service descriptions to Directory Facil-
itator(DF). During this process, a masquerading agent should
be prevented from registering its services or service descrip-
tions and at the end damaging the platform. Third, there is also
a communication layer called Agent Communication Chan-
nel(ACC) which transmits agent communication messages.
Those messages should have confidentiality, integrity, authenti-
cation and non-repudiation properties according to FIPA secu-
rity specification. This specification introduces Agent Platform
Security Manager(APSM) which defines security issues of
AMS and requires a PKI for registering agents. The speci-
fication of FIPA for message-based communication security
uses Agent Communication Language(ACL) envelope added
properties.
III. SECURITY PATTERNS
Security is often an afterthought functionality in system design
and implementation. The enterprise context and requirements
that drive system security are often not addressed explicitly
and are not incorporated into system architectures. The desired
approach is to begin to address security together with the
system design rather than the repair-service approach [3].
The basic idea behind patterns is to capture expert knowl-
edge in the form of documentation with a specific structure
containing proven solutions for recurring problems in a given
domain. In particular, security patterns can be more useful
when people responsible for systems have little or no security
expertise.
In this paper, Agent Authenticator, Agent Certification Au-
thority and Access Controller patterns have been examined in
detail. The remaining patterns defined in [7], namely Agency
Guard and Sandbox patterns are out of scope of this paper.
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A. Agent Authenticator
Agents must be authenticated in the platform before they
are allowed for intra- and inter-platform communication. The
Agent Authenticator pattern determines the authentication pro-
cess of agents in an agency. The authentication process is
implemented by using digital signatures generated with agent’s
or agency’s secret key.
The advantage of Agent Authenticator is to check the
agent’s identity before it involves in any communication within
the agency. Authentication of the requesting agent could be
verified by Agent Authenticator. This pattern also prevents
implementation of different authentication mechanisms for
different agents.
The disadvantage of this approach is that Agent Authen-
ticator becomes a central point. So that when the Agent
Authenticator crashes, the whole system would be under risk.
The design of the agent authentication model in SEAGENT
by using SEAGENT Plan Editor is shown in Figure 1. Sup-
plyPrivateInformation behaviour takes the owner policy and
key pair of the agent. Outcome of this behaviour is passed
to SupplyPrivateKey action. Private key of the agent is used
for creating its digital signature for authentication issues in
SupplyDigitalSignature action. AuthenticationManager action
is the connection point of AgentAuthenticator with AgentCer-
tificationAuthority to obtain the related request parameters by
the issued certificate of the agent. These parameters could be
subject, issuer of the certificate, validity time of the certificate
to validate the digital signature and apply the authentication
rules to decide agent’s authentication for the communication.
AgentAuthenticator lastly takes its external provision as Re-
questParameters from AgentCertificationAuthority and passes
these parameters to AuthenticationManager by provision in-
heritance. So the Agent Authentication mechanism halts by
the decision of this behaviour’s planning activities and the
outcome of AuthenticationManager causes the authentication
decision for the requestor agent.
Fig. 1. Agent Authenticator Plan in SEAGENT (General View)
B. Agent Certification Authority
In a trusted environment, every agent is required to possess
a certificate which includes a public key. The corresponding
private key is stored by the agent in a secure manner. These
agents verify their identities by generating digital signatures
using their own private keys.
The advantage of Agent Certification Authority is the ability
to verify a requestor agent. So that the indicated public key
is proven to be really used for the communication. This
pattern helps to design an appropriate signature verification
mechanism to satisfy identity and authentication requirements
for a specific domain or situation [3]. The disadvantage of this
pattern could be scalability problem when a lot of agents want
to request for certification.
C. Access Controller
This is a pattern that restricts agent access to resources.
Agents with various privileges can exist in an agency. Agents
requesting for a resource could be denied or accepted ac-
cording to the requested action. Agents in the agency could
access the resources(or other agents) according to the response
of Access Controller. These responses have been sent to the
agents with the indicated privileges. If there is an agent’s
resource requirement instead of access to an agent, Resource
Manager behaves as a helper service to the Access Controller
and accesses the related agents’ resources.
The advantage of Access Controller is the usage of different
policies for different actions. In Figure 2, the ACA gives
Agent2 to send-to privilege for communicating with Agent1.
These privilege types could be obtained from FIPA-ACL based
message envelope by different SecurityObjects. If the Agent2
tries to take send-to privilege, the SecurityObjects for different
agents could determine the acceptance or denial of the message
with inform or refuse communicative acts in FIPA. There is
a disadvantage of this pattern that the crash of the Access
Controller makes the access protocol unusable in agency.
Fig. 2. FIPA ACL Message Example with Security Access Information
IV. SOFTWARE AGENT CERTIFICATION
The proposed approach attempts to employ security patterns
for model driven design with reusable code and suggests
utilization of semantic data on certification and policy based
agent access models. It also defines a message extension for
a new element that describes a form of the message security.
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Essential security services explained in [8] are presented in
layers.
ACA is a security wrapper for the system that dominates the
protocol steps and supplies them to the agents. During Agent
Certification Authority [5] process time, ACA enables both
sender and receiver agents to negotiate security parameters and
then on agents will communicate using the negotiated values.
This negotiation also helps to decouple the multi agent system
from selected security approach.
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the security level of
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information with certificate
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Fig. 3. Steps of Agent Certification Mechanism
The software agent certification steps have been illustrated
in Figure 3. First, ACA creates public/private key pair and
stores its certification information(issuer, subject, owner, va-
lidity, public key with key algorithm information, signature
information, default certificate policies and policy mappings).
The storage process is based on XML data for syntactic data
compatibility and used by all agents. By default, authentication
across agents will be accomplished by the same algorithm as
the intra-platform communication. This authentication mecha-
nism will be based on ACA as mandatory authentication and
access control approach between agents. Because the access
information and related certification information for supplier
agents have to be supplied to the requestor agents by ACA.
If ACA accepts the requests of the Agent1, it sends expected
parameters for the security level of communication. ACA
accepts the certificate and registration information with policy
data from Agent1 and ACA saves certification information in
XML and policy information in OWL(Web Ontology Lan-
guage) format to its database. Then it informs the requestor
agent. The semantic data for policy information aims to collect
the policies in a tractable way by the Access Controller.
ACA shall contractually require that the subscriber indicates
acceptance or rejection of the certificate following its issuance,
in accordance with procedures established by the ACA.
Agent1 creates its key pair and stores them as explained in
the first step of ACA. Then this agent requests security pa-
rameters and certificate from ACA. All private keys and other
security related data have to be available to their owner only.
Data may not be accessible to other agents (even the agent
platform). Every agent has to keep its private data secured but
the platform based public information with certificate could
be shared between agents according to ACA based parameters.
So ACA will send certification information to the agents if the
requesting side has the right to communicate in the platform.
The certificate policies for agents are initialized in ACA by
the security engineer of the system.
Agent1 prepares certificate and requests to register it with
semantic policy information. Then the communication of
Agent1 with ACA ends for the certification and semantic data
exchange.
The access information have been stored as semantic infor-
mation shown in Section V. This access information is sent
and received with a SecurityObject. The SecurityObject can
be included as user-defined slot into the envelope (e.g. X-
Security) as used in [8], or, if standardized by FIPA, as an
optional slot (e.g. Security). Furthermore, the slot containing
the SecurityObject can contain a set of SecurityObjects, for
different security attributes applied to a message. The approach
told in this paper as adding Security slot to the message
Envelope.
ACA accepts or denies this request according to semanti-
cally presented data in its database. Information message from
ACA to Agent2 with security slot for access information in a
FIPA-ACL message example similar to [9] is shown in Figure
2.
V. SEMANTIC BASED AGENT ACCESS CONTROL
MECHANISM
After defining agent certification process details of Access
Controller mechanism have been explained in this section.
First, access control policy includes a set of rules that associate
some credentials to use capability of a right. So that the issues
with the specified credentials could supply the capability.
Credential is any property associated with an entity. When the
entity is suitable to the policy rules in the system, the required
action for this entity could be populated [10].
All agents have to digitally sign all service requests for
AMS, DF and other agents. As there is a public/private key
pair for each of the agent, the agent can be thought as
accountable by the platform. So that when an agent wants
to register to the platform, its credentials have to be checked
by Access Controller of which decision is based on security
policies that have been defined in the platform. These policies
could be defined in two levels: platform level and agent level
[11]. Platform level policies control the requests for AMS
and DF of the platform. Agent level access policies specify
who can access the services of the specified agent. A simple
message that assigns a right to an agent is shown in Figure 2.
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When the certification steps as explained in Section IV
have been constructed, AMS controls the validity of the
certificate by the default certificate authority in the platform.
For organization wide certification, certification path could
be chained and the verification step could be processed by
the help of Agent Certification Authority. If the certificate is
valid, AMS restores agent’s policies that have to be checked
during the communication with AMS. All of these policies are
in Access Controller’s database by default. AMS and Access
Controller always communicates with each other to inform the
changing policies in the autonomous environment. So when
Access Controller has been crashed for a short time, AMS
based policy rules could still be applied by AMS with its
internal policy engine. AMS and DF have a list of conditions
that an agent must satisfy in order to contact a particular
agent or use a particular service. While AMS and DF have to
know the access privileges of agents in [11], Access Controller
mechanism have to access and know their rights. So that the
protection from the threat could be applied in a central place.
Agents could register their services in open or private
ways. In open way, the only DF based policies have to be
applied for the agents’ access to the service. In private way,
Access Controller communicates with DF and access control
mechanism have been processed for the owner of the service.
For the verification of rights, a service agent expects all the
credentials from the requestor agent at the time of the request
in order to use its services. The service agent will check its
internal knowledge base and ask for Access Controller to give
permission to the requestor agent. According to the allowance
of the semantic policy information, request could be answered
in a positive way. Otherwise, request would be denied until the
requestor agent has the suitable credentials to call this service.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, security patterns that have been used in multi-
agent systems have been considered. Also policy based access
control has been determined that each entity is able to specify
and process policy by help of Access Controller or by itself for
security and privacy. In future, the specifications of policies
are planned to be fully constructed in declarative manner
and the ACL based messages to be considered in a semantic
manner. With the help of policy based semantic language, the
distributed policy management could be supplied better by
inter-platform communication by the platforms that use same
ontologies.
Future work will be based on the new version of
SEAGENT’s role based agent mechanisms. Role based agents
would have their own role based access policies for Access
Controller. Then these agents could have been prioritized
according to their goals in the platform [12].
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